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“A PERSON OTHERWISE INNOCENT”:  POLICING 
ENTRAPMENT IN PREVENTATIVE, UNDERCOVER 
COUNTERTERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS 
Jon Sherman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  “THE EARLIEST STAGE POSSIBLE” 
In a 2006 speech, former Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty 
said the following: 
In the wake of September 11, this aggressive, proactive, and preventative 
course is the only acceptable response from a department of government 
charged with enforcing our laws and protecting the American people.  
Awaiting an attack is not an option.  That is why the Department of Jus-
tice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation’s secu-
rity at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—
preventative—prosecutions.1 
Though the military’s counterterrorism tactics have dominated our 
post-9/11 consciousness of counterterrorism, federal criminal inves-
tigation and law enforcement directed by the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) have 
adapted and expanded in an attempt to prevent terrorism with “for-
ward-leaning” strategies.  Observers have advanced a few theories for 
the accelerating shift to preventative policing and prosecutions:  con-
stitutional difficulties with military detention, most recently in Boume-
diene v. Bush,2 the irrelevance of immigration law enforcement to 
“homegrown” terrorists; the increasing decentralization of the global 
jihadist movement; and the prevalence of “unaffiliated” terrorists op-
 
 *  Jon Sherman is an Associate at WilmerHale LLP in Washington, D.C. Columbia Law 
School, J.D. 2008; Harvard College, A.B. 2003.  Many thanks to my family for their sup-
port, Professors Harold Edgar and Daniel Richman for their invaluable suggestions and 
insight, and the American Constitution Society, which made this publication possible. 
 1 Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty, Prepared Remarks at the American Enterprise 
Institute (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/
dag_speech_060524.html. 
 2 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (declaring the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Military 
Commissions Act an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and grant-
ing Guantanamo Bay detainees the right to challenge their detention in federal court).  
In the first Guantanamo case to reach the merits, Judge Richard Leon of the District 
Court for the District of Columbia subsequently ordered five of the six Bosnian-Algerian 
petitioners released.  Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008). 
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erating without any connection to a designated foreign terrorist or-
ganization (“FTO”).3 
Whatever the precise reasons, federal criminal prosecutions have 
played an ever-expanding role in counterterrorism.  According to the 
New York University Law Center on Law and Security, between Sep-
tember 11, 2001 and September 11, 2008, 228 persons have been 
charged and prosecuted under a “terrorism statute,” with another 
465 persons charged under other statutes but “publicly associated 
with terrorism by the DOJ.”4  Of the 130 “Resolved Terrorism Trials” 
out of 228 resolved or pending terrorism prosecutions, 93 persons 
have been convicted; 12 have been acquitted; and 25 have seen a mis-
trial or dismissal.5  The other 465 defendants have been charged with 
general criminal conspiracy, general fraud, immigration violations, 
racketeering, and other offenses.6  Some scholars have noted that 
pretextual charging has played a significant role in the government’s 
early intervention strategy.7 
The Justice Department’s focus on early intervention tactics and 
“anticipatory prosecution,” as Professor Robert Chesney has called it, 
 
 3 See MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD:  TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(2008); see generally Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?  Anticipatory Prosecution and the 
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007) (describing several reasons 
why the government has focused on intervening at early stages in terrorist plots). 
 4 NYU LAW CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:  U.S. EDITION 2 (2008), 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/Sept08TTRCFinal1.pdf.  The Center de-
fines “terrorism” to include “the core terrorism statutes:  18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Material 
Support to Terrorists), 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Or-
ganization), 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (Terrorism Financing), 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (Financial Sup-
port to a Foreign Terrorist Organization), and 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (Terrorism).”  Id. at 2 
n.2.  The Center uses 18 U.S.C. § 2332 to encompass 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332 and 2332a 
through 2332h, statutes “criminalizing acts of terrorism using specific weapons.” Id. 
 5 Id.; id. at 2 n.1 (“‘Prosecutions’ as used herein are counted per defendant.  A proceeding 
with three co-defendants, for example, counts as three prosecutions.  If the same person 
is prosecuted in two separate proceedings under two separate indictments, they are 
counted separately.”). 
 6 Id. at 5. 
 7 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge:  An Essay on the Political 
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 618–24 (2005) (describing the 
government’s strategy, employed during organized crime and terrorism investigations, of 
arresting suspects for lesser offenses in order to prevent the commission of more serious 
crimes or to maximize the probability of a conviction).  Richman and Stuntz also cite a 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) study surveying 288 convictions in 2002 which the 
Justice Department had classified as terrorism-related.  Id. at 620.  According to the GAO, 
at least 132 convictions were misclassified and the “overall accuracy of the remaining 156 
convictions [was] questionable.”  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:  
BETTER MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS NEEDED TO ENSURE 
ACCURACY OF TERRORISM-RELATED STATISTICS 6 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d03266.pdf. 
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under federal conspiracy statutes (18 U.S.C. § 956(a)–(b)) and mate-
rial support statutes (18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B) has made un-
dercover investigations followed by sting operations a more attractive 
strategy.8  The FBI increasingly relies on confidential informants to 
gather intelligence, conduct surveillance of mosques, and pursue 
suspected terrorist plots.9  In several recent cases, including United 
States v. Batiste,10 United States v. Hayat,11 United States v. Lakhani,12 and 
United States v. Siraj,13 an undercover agent has “played a crucial cata-
 
 8 Robert Chesney, Anticipatory Prosecution in Terrorism-Related Cases, in THE CHANGING ROLE 
OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 157 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds. 
2008); see also 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006) (making “conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure 
persons or damage property in a foreign country” a federal crime if “any of the conspira-
tors commits an act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the 
conspiracy”); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (making it a federal crime to provide “material 
support to terrorists”); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) (making it a federal crime to provide 
“material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations”). 
 9 See, e.g., Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 
2006, (Magazine), at 16 (describing the trial of a suspected terrorist and the key role an 
informant played in his conviction); John Caher, Terrorism Trial of Muslims Raises Issues of 
Entrapment, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 2006, at 1 (stating that an investigation of a suspected ter-
rorist “began . . . when a Pakistani immigrant arrested on unrelated charges visited [the 
suspect’s] pizza shop as a wired government agent”).  Eric Lichtblau wrote: 
 In Albany, two leaders of a mosque are facing trial on charges that they helped 
launder money as part of an F.B.I. undercover sting in a fictitious plot to acquire a 
shoulder-fired missile for a New York City attack.  In Manhattan, an undercover 
operation helped the federal authorities in March break up what they described as 
an international arms-smuggling ring that sold black-market assault rifles in the 
United States and was plotting to import missiles from Eastern Europe. 
 In San Diego, two Pakistani men are awaiting sentencing and a third faces trial 
on charges that they took part in what they thought was a Qaeda plot to trade 
drugs for missiles . . . . 
 A number of other undercover operations are continuing, officials said, and 
the Justice Department has committed more prosecutors and investigators to han-
dle informants in terror cases and to initiate undercover operations. 
  Eric Lichtblau, Trying to Thwart Possible Terrorists Quickly, F.B.I. Agents Are Often Playing 
Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at A10; Walter Pincus, FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2006, at A1 (“[C]ourt records released since then suggest that what 
Gonzales described as a ‘deadly plot’ was virtually the pipe dream of a few men with al-
most no ability to pull it off on their own.  The suspects have raised questions in court 
about the FBI informants’ role in keeping the plan alive.”); William K. Rashbaum, Win-
dow Opens On City Tactics Among Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 29 (noting the 
“depth of the [New York] Police Intelligence Division’s clandestine programs . . . to infil-
trate mosques and Muslim gatherings around New York City”); see also Sherman v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (noting the dangers of governmental entrapment). 
 10  United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61186 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 
2007). 
 11  United States v. Hayat, No. 2:05-cr-0240, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43737 (E.D. Ca. June 19, 
2006). 
 12 480 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 13 468 F. Supp. 2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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lytic role” in the criminal plot.14  Though some cases involve career 
agents, many informants are often enlisted as part of a brokered deal 
with the government to eliminate or reduce criminal penalties, drop 
criminal charges, approve a political asylum application, or reverse a 
removal order.15  This growing reliance on undercover cooperating 
witnesses and sting operations for counterterrorism has dramatically 
increased the risk of entrapment. 
This Article seeks to reexamine the entrapment defense against 
the rise of anticipatory terrorism prosecutions, and specifically, the 
charging of material support in furtherance of a predicate offense 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.  I argue that entrapment doctrine must be 
restructured to keep FBI counterterrorism efforts targeted and fo-
cused and to safeguard innocent First Amendment activity from the 
reach of highly inchoate offenses, which are aggressively pursued with 
undercover informants. 
II.  THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND ANTICIPATORY PROSECUTION 
A.  The “Unwary Criminal” and the “Unwary Innocent”:  A History of the 
Entrapment Defense 
The Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in 
Sorrells v. United States and did so without grounding it in the Due 
Process Clause or any other constitutional provision.16  Conceding 
that “[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those en-
gaged in criminal enterprises,”17 the Court nevertheless barred prose-
cution of defendants for “a crime where the government officials are 
the instigators of his conduct.”18  The dividing line between a legiti-
mate sting operation and an impermissible “instigation” was unclear 
when the defense was first established and remains so today.  The 
Court tried to establish boundaries for sting operations, arguing that 
the government exceeds its police powers when it “implant[s] in the 
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged of-
fense and induce[s] its commission in order that . . . [it] may prose-
 
 14 Aziz Huq, The New Counterterrorism:  Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in LIBERTY 
UNDER ATTACK 167, 173 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007). 
 15 See id. at 173–74, in LIBERTY UNDER ATTACK 167, 173 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. 
eds., 2007); Caher, supra note 9; Lee Romney, Pressured to Name Names, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2006, at A1 (discussing the government’s use of minor immigration violations as leverage 
in recruiting informants). 
 16 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
 17 Id. at 441. 
 18 Id. at 452. 
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cute.”19  The entrapment defense authorized an inquiry into the de-
fendant’s predisposition largely forbidden by federal and state rules 
of evidence.20  However, the Court did insist on restricting the inquiry 
into the defendant’s predisposition to prevent a fishing expedition 
for a generalized propensity to commit crimes, demanding:  “the is-
sues raised and the evidence adduced must be pertinent to the con-
trolling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise inno-
cent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged 
offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own offi-
cials.”21  This suggests that the government may always rebut entrap-
ment by demonstrating predisposition, but that predisposition evi-
dence must be tailored to the specific offense at issue. 
After Sorrells, the Court revisited entrapment in Sherman v. United 
States to apply a perhaps more restrictive standard:  entrapment lies 
when “the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party 
and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would 
not have attempted.”22  The critical distinction was between “the trap 
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal,” lan-
guage fundamentally in tension with the most fundamental of crimi-
nal law tenets, the act requirement.23  It is said that the defendant 
puts his character in issue by claiming the defense, but it is worth not-
ing that a jury, in rejecting entrapment, may ultimately convict the 
defendant not only on evidence of the crime in question, but also on 
an impermissible inference of guilt drawn from predisposition evi-
dence.24  Seeking to apply the vague standards of Sorrells and Sherman, 
the federal courts generated a wide array of definitions and eviden-
tiary standards.  Scholars have identified and endlessly debated two 
tests developed in the case law—the “subjective” and “objective” 
 
 19 Id. at 442. 
 20 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular oc-
casion . . . .”); People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 469 (N.Y. 1930) (stating that the gov-
ernment may not put forth evidence of defendant’s propensity of character when the de-
fendant has not put character in issue). 
 21 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. 
 22 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958). 
 23 Id. at 372; see also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (affirming a convic-
tion that resulted from an undercover sting of an “unwary criminal,” in this case a me-
thamphetamine producer). 
 24 Asserting the entrapment defense renders admissible certain character evidence that 
might otherwise be barred due to prejudice under FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”). 
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tests.25  The objective approach addresses the government’s conduct 
and asks whether a reasonable person could have resisted the in-
ducement to commit the offense.26  The subjective approach, offi-
cially recognized as the test for entrapment in federal court in Hamp-
ton v. United States, focuses on the individualized predisposition of the 
defendant to ascertain whether the government implanted the crimi-
nal intent and induced commission or whether the defendant, given 
an opportunity, would have committed the crime independent of the 
undercover activity.27  Today, the defendant’s predisposition to com-
mit the charged offense is the governing standard for entrapment.  
Two circuit courts have construed the subjective test to allow the gov-
ernment three related ways to rebut the entrapment defense by dem-
onstrating:  
(1) [A]n existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for 
which the defendant is charged, (2) an already formed design on the 
part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged, or (3) a 
willingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by 
the accused’s ready response to the inducement.28 
Some courts have also articulated a list of factors for consideration in 
the predisposition inquiry.29 
The constitutional trouble that arises in the prosecution of incho-
ate terrorism-related offenses originates with this extension of judicial 
inquiry into the counterfactual possibilities of what the defendant 
might have done but for the agent’s conduct.  When the act require-
ment is so diluted, the admitted predisposition evidence may im-
properly sway the jury’s decision and yield a conviction without the 
requisite proof.  That is why the courts have placed the burden of 
persuasion on the prosecution after the defense meets its burden of 
 
 25 See Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 408–13 
(1999) (arguing that the subjective and objective tests have non-existent practical differ-
ences); see also Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 151 (2008) 
(explaining that the objective test is rooted in the Due Process Clause).  See generally PAUL 
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (3d ed. 2002) (providing an overview of the defense, 
including the tension between the objective and subjective tests). 
 26 See Allen, supra note 25, at 411. 
 27 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976). 
 28 United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 945 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 29 See, for example, United States v. Fedroff for a list of factors: 
[1] the character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior criminal re-
cord; [2] whether the suggestion of the criminal activity was initially made by the 
Government; [3] whether the defendant was engaged in the criminal activity for 
profit; [4] whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit the offense, 
overcome only by repeated Government inducement or persuasion; and [5] the 
nature of the inducement or persuasion supplied by the Government. 
  874 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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production.30  In Jacobson v. United States, the Government failed to 
meet its burden to overcome the defense’s evidence that it had tar-
geted the accused with two and a half years of mailings and commu-
nications from fabricated organizations attempting to persuade the 
defendant that the First Amendment protected child pornography.31  
While the Court did note the Government’s efforts to mislead the de-
fendant as to the legality of child pornography, it did not explicitly 
incorporate this into the test for entrapment.32  This suggests that an 
element of misdirection as to lawfulness should be persuasive, but not 
dispositive, evidence of entrapment. 
There is a line of cases which further complicates the definition of 
the defense.  In the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hol-
lingsworth, Judge Posner implied that the ability to commit the crime 
should play a role in a trial court’s determination on the issue of en-
trapment.33  Without expressly requiring an additional showing of de-
fendant capability to commit the offense, Posner did, however, elabo-
rate on the scope of predisposition, arguing that though “ability” can 
usually be “presumed,” entrapment should probably be found “when 
the defendant is not in a position without the government’s help to 
become involved in illegal activity.”34  Some courts have interpreted 
this language to mean a defendant must possess both willingness and 
“present means” for entrapment to be defeated.35  The Fifth Circuit has 
explicitly adopted the “positional predisposition” test to supplement 
the subjective predisposition test in United States v. Wise and United 
States v. Reyes.36  The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Thickstun rejected 
 
 30 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992) (reversing a conviction for pur-
chase of child pornography on entrapment grounds and placing the burden of persua-
sion squarely on the government to “prove beyond [a] reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by 
Government agents,” the equivalent of the absence of entrapment). 
 31 Id. at 550. 
 32 Id. at 553–54. 
 33 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 34 Id.  But see Lori J. Rankin, Case Note, Entrapment:  A Defense for the Willing, yet Unready, 
Criminal?, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1487, 1507–15 (1995) (critiquing the majority in Hol-
lingsworth, arguing that the majority erroneously interpreted the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Jacobson); Elliot Rothstein, Note, United States v. Hollingsworth, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 303, 304 (1995) (asserting that the court in Hollingsworth incorrectly interpreted Ja-
cobson and that “readiness” should not be considered a distinct factor). 
 35 Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202.  Judge Posner explicitly stated that “lack of present means” 
was insufficient for entrapment to lie, but suggested it should be persuasive evidence.  Id.  
See also United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 739 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wise, 
221 F.3d 140, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 36 Reyes, 239 F.3d at 742; Wise, 221 F.3d at 155.  Despite this seemingly pro-defendant expan-
sion of the test, both cases affirmed the lower courts’ convictions.  Reyes, 239 F.3d at 746; 
Wise, 221 F.3d at 158. 
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this view.37  The circuit split remains unresolved, but the weight of 
opinion seems to side with the rejection of a capacity or “present 
means” test. 
B.  Anticipatory Prosecution for Material Support to Terrorism Under 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A and Entrapment Reconsidered 
The prosecution of inchoate terrorism-related offenses has high-
lighted the dramatic risk of entrapment in undercover operations, 
which lure defendants into conduct sufficient for an early arrest and 
conviction.  Professor Robert Chesney has explored the prosecution 
of “unaffiliated” terrorism and the inchoate offenses the government 
increasingly charges.38  Chesney has identified two statutes that the 
Government uses in anticipatory prosecution of terrorists unaffiliated 
with any FTO:  conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a) and ma-
terial support charges under the lesser-known 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.  
Section 956(a) criminalizes: 
[Conspiracies] to commit at any place outside the United States an act 
that would constitute the offense of murder, kidnapping, or maiming if 
committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States . . . if any of the conspirators commits an act within the ju-
risdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy.39 
Since indictments under § 956(a) read FTOs and the global jihadist 
movement itself as unitary, ongoing conspiracies, § 956(a) has al-
lowed prosecution for mere membership and other acts in further-
ance of an FTO or the global jihadist movement writ large without 
connecting the defendant’s actions to a specific plot to commit a spe-
cific offense.40  The recently enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339D,41 which cri-
 
 37 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 38 Chesney, supra note 3. 
 39 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) (2006). 
 40 For instance, United States v. bin Laden (see Ninth Superseding Indictment, 98-cv-1023 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), available at http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/binLadenetals2-
98cr1023.pdf.) was uncontroversial as it identified a specific plot, but United States v. Sat-
tar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), characterized the Egyptian Islamic Group 
(EIG), an FTO, as a “single, ongoing conspiracy” to kill, maim, or kidnap under § 956(a), 
and any involvement in it would render the defendant a co-conspirator.  Chesney, supra 
note 3, at 466–69. 
 41 § 2339D makes an offense to “receiv[e] military-type training from a foreign terrorist or-
ganization”: 
 (a) OFFENSE.—Whoever knowingly receives military-type training from or on 
behalf of any organization designated at the time of the training by the Secretary 
of State under section 219(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a for-
eign terrorist organization shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for ten 
years, or both.  To violate this subsection, a person must have knowledge that the 
organization is a designated terrorist organization . . ., that the organization has 
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minalizes unlicensed military-type training abroad, can achieve many 
of the same goals (if a specific FTO runs a training camp), though 
proving a violation is perhaps more difficult.42  While § 956(a) has 
surely expanded prosecutorial capabilities, it is most potent when 
charged as a § 2339A predicate offense.  This Article therefore con-
centrates on § 2339A’s interaction with undercover investigations. 
Section 2339A does not restrict the class of material support re-
cipients to FTOs.43  Instead, it prohibits providing “[m]aterial support 
or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in prepa-
ration for, or in carrying out” one of forty-seven predicate offenses, 
thirty-five of which are conspiracy-capable (§ 956(a) is among 
them).44  Material support or resources is defined to include: 
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious mate-
rials.45 
Since there is no restriction to FTOs, § 2339A is frequently charged 
in unaffiliated terrorism prosecutions.46  Prosecutors have charged 
this offense in novel ways to push the outer limits of inchoate crimi-
nal liability.47 
Several factors make the statute particularly effective as an early 
prevention measure and therefore more vulnerable to manipulation 
in anticipatory prosecution on the fringes of criminal liability:  (1) 
the predicate offense need not be committed, nor even attempted; 
(2) no agreement is necessary for an underlying conspiracy, so mate-
rial support liability can attach before a conspiracy even forms; (3) 
the support may be in furtherance of completed crimes or of other 
preparatory acts; and (4) the statute’s conspiracy-capable predicate 
 
engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . ., or that the organization has engaged 
or engages in terrorism . . . . 
  18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006). 
 42 The provision was enacted as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
(IRTPA) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3761 (2004).  As of September 
11, 2008, there were no prosecutions publicly announced as terrorism cases under this 
statute.  NYU LAW CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., supra note 4, at 2 n.2. 
 43 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006). 
 44 Id.  Of the forty-six predicate offenses enumerated at the time, Chesney’s tabulation for 
prosecutions between 2001 and 2004 shows that § 956 was charged in twenty-seven 
counts.  Chesney, supra note 3, at 476–77. 
 45 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006). 
 46 Chesney, supra note 3, at 474. 
 47 Id. at 479. 
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offenses essentially criminalize “aiding-and-abetting a conspiracy.”48  
One other aspect that broadens the scope of liability is the expansive 
definition of “material support,” which defines the provision of “per-
sonnel” in subsection (b)(1) as “1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself.”49  The combination of these factors permits federal 
prosecutors to seek conviction for the earliest stage of liability cur-
rently allowable under federal criminal law. 
Chesney identifies three categories in the cases, which vary in the 
nexus between a defendant’s actual intentions and actions and the 
underlying predicate offense.50  Notably, even in the uncontroversial 
“close-nexus” category, a jury acquitted defendant Gale Nettles on the 
§ 2339A count due to possible discomfort with the sting operation 
(Nettles had sold ammonium nitrate to a government informant pos-
ing as a terrorist representative), while still convicting Nettles on 
counterfeiting and explosives charges.51  A notion akin to entrapment 
may have informed the jury’s decision to acquit even when the de-
fendant’s conduct was not particularly inchoate. 
The “intermediate-nexus” category encompasses “overlap” cases in 
which § 956(a) likely could have constituted independent grounds 
for the material support conviction or cases in which conspiracy will 
be unavailable to prosecutors, and § 2339A is the only remaining al-
ternative.  Chesney writes that if “the circumstances are such that the 
only available inchoate crime charge would involve attempt rather 
than conspiracy, the relative need for the § 2339A charge is much 
higher.”52  Since a conspiracy cannot be formed with a government 
agent who does not have an actual criminal intent and attempt would 
have been difficult to prove at trial, § 2339A was the only realistic 
charge available to the government in United States v. Lakhani.53 
The “open nexus” scenario illustrates how § 2339A and § 956(a) 
have been charged in tandem to establish liability at a pre-conspiracy 
stage capturing preparatory, and in certain cases equivocal, conduct.  
The U.S. Attorney will charge § 956(a) or another conspiracy-capable 
 
 48 Id. at 479–80. 
 49 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006). 
 50 Chesney, supra note 3, at 480–86. 
 51 United States v. Nettles, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1086 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Chesney, supra note 
3, at 481–82. 
 52 Chesney, supra note 3 at 482.  United States v. Babar, in which the procurement of bomb-
making materials at a training camp in Pakistan could have been viewed as either con-
spiracy or material support, is arguably a case of the former, whereas United States v. Lak-
hani, a sting operation concerning a surface-to-air missile purchase, is arguably a case of 
the latter.  Id. at 482–83. 
 53 Id. at 484. 
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crime as the predicate offense for § 2339A, criminalizing the prepara-
tory steps to a conspiracy.54  Several cases have reached this new fron-
tier of liability with forms of support including fundraising, recruit-
ing, procuring equipment, creating a “support cell,” providing one’s 
self as personnel, and establishing and running training camps, in 
furtherance of no identifiable agreement to commit a specific of-
fense.55  These cases involve the criminalization of acts taken in prep-
aration of a conspiracy.  Whether an agreement to commit a specific 
offense ever results is irrelevant to conviction under § 2339A.  So long 
as the defendant intended such preliminary support to facilitate the 
formation of a conspiracy, he or she can be convicted under § 2339A. 
Though stacked inchoate offenses are not unknown in federal 
criminal law, the § 2339A–§ 956(a) charge is fairly radical.  In Salinas 
v. United States, Justice Kennedy applied settled rules of federal con-
spiracy law when he wrote: 
A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to 
commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive of-
fense. . . .  If conspirators have a plan which calls for some con-
spirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide sup-
port, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.56 
The hard question in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions57 (“RICO”) cases is whether the conspiracy reaches a peripheral 
actor who only contributed minor support; the conspiracy itself, of 
course, must actually exist.  By contrast, in § 2339A cases, liability for 
material support attaches whether or not an underlying conspiracy 
ever materializes.  While RICO conspiracy is uncomfortably expansive 
in certain cases, it is not as problematic as allowing prosecutors to 
contend that certain actions are in furtherance of an as yet unrealized 
conspiracy, a specific meeting of the minds.  Alternatively, one might 
 
 54 See id. at 484–85. 
 55 See United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (convicting defendant for 
facilitating communications between Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and the Egyptian Is-
lamic Group); Indictment, United States v. Abdi, No. 2:04-CR-88 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (in-
dicting defendant on a § 2339A count, material support in furtherance of § 956(a) con-
spiracy by seeking jihadist military training in Africa and plotting bombing of mall); 
Indictment, United States v. Mustafa, No. 04-CR-356 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (indicting London’s 
famous jihadist cleric Abu Hamza for attempting to establish a training camp in Oregon 
and facilitating attempts to reach camps in Afghanistan); Second Superseding Indict-
ment, United States v. al-Hussayen, No. 3-CR-48 (D. Idaho 2003) (indicting for charges of 
online activity and fundraising in support of jihadists in Israel, Chechnya, and elsewhere); 
Indictment, United States v. Arnaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (indicting for fi-
nancing various jihadist organizations through Arnaout’s charity, the Benevolence Inter-
national Foundation). 
 56 522 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1997). 
 57 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006). 
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argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)’s “pattern of racketeering” essentially 
criminalizes an ongoing conspiracy.58  Application of § 1962(d) would 
then criminalize conspiracy to form a racketeering conspiracy.  Even 
if this were an accurate portrayal of subsection (c), the underlying 
conspiracy or “pattern of racketeering” must be actual under RICO, 
not merely conjectural or aspirational as with § 2339A.59  Combined 
with the government’s broad reading of “conspiracy” under § 956(a), 
criminal liability is pushed to the earliest point now countenanced 
under American law and dangerously close to the punishment of un-
popular speech or thought.  There is one case, however, that seems 
to have transgressed that ultimate boundary, the act requirement.60 
When the government criminalizes such inchoate, equivocal acts, 
the undercover informant is charged with an even more delicate task 
of avoiding entrapment, while securing evidence of a crime.  The ear-
lier the intervention, the greater the risk of entrapment will be.  Simi-
larly, the more inchoate the offense charged, the greater the risk of 
entrapment.  There are two overlapping issues in these cases:  (1) the 
questionable fixity of intent in a defendant accused of inchoate 
crimes (i.e., whether an inchoate, equivocal act would have led to a 
completed crime); and (2) the possible implantation of criminal in-
tent in a defendant who would not have completed an offense but for 
the government’s inducement. 
 
 58 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). 
 59 Federal District Judge Gerard Lynch has gone further to describe RICO as the criminali-
zation of status:  this is suggestive of how expansive or vague conspiracy offenses can run 
afoul of the act requirement.  Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO:  The Crime of Being a Criminal, 
Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 661–63 (1987); see also Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (holding that defendant may not be punished for his “status” as 
an addict, lest the state violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; an act is re-
quired). 
 60 In United States v. Hayat, a young Pakistani-American, who had been encouraged by an 
undercover informant to return to Pakistan and attend a militant training camp, was con-
victed under § 2339A on the thinnest of evidence:  statements supportive of jihadists; a 
scrapbook with similar articles; a prayer kept in a wallet that the jury found violent; a vi-
deotaped “confession” with ambiguous, noncommittal responses to agents who asked 
leading questions about his time in Pakistan and suggested answers; and various taped 
conversations, which according to the government, revealed the defendant’s willingness 
to commit an act of terrorism.  First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hayat, No. 
05-240 (E.D. Cal. 2005); see also Arax, supra note 9; Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, THE 
ATL. MONTHLY, Oct. 2006, at 82.  The real indeterminate question was whether Hayat in-
tended to act on his training, if he had even acquired such in Pakistan (the evidence was 
all circumstantial and inconclusive).  Hayat was convicted of a violation of § 2339A with 
the predicate offense of § 2332b (an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries).  
Hayat, No. 05-240.  As Professor Chesney describes it, this essentially constituted a convic-
tion for “providing himself as ‘personnel’ in furtherance of his own potential violation of 
§ 2332b in the future.”  Chesney, supra note 3, at 491. 
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According to the Attorney General’s Guidelines on FBI Under-
cover Operations, “[e]ntrapment occurs when the Government im-
plants in the mind of a person who is not otherwise disposed to 
commit the offense the disposition to commit the offense and then 
induces the commission of that offense in order to prosecute.”61  The 
Guidelines list a series of criteria for authorization of an undercover 
sting operation which are somewhat more stringent than the case law, 
including requirements that: 
(4) . . . (i) There is reasonable indication that the subject is engaging, 
has engaged, or is likely to engage in the illegal activity proposed or in 
similar illegal conduct; or, 
(ii) The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so that there 
is reason to believe that any persons drawn to the opportunity, or 
brought to it, are predisposed to engage in the contemplated illegal 
conduct.62 
Informants, who are frequently pressured into the role and pushed to 
secure results,63 may not realize how fine the line between artifice and 
implantation is in the context of material support to terrorism.  Their 
superiors may also dispense with these vague standards designed to 
avoid ensnaring the “unwary innocent.”  The informant may even 
willfully transgress the Guidelines in the hope of catching a “terrorist” 
to secure the promised reward. 
For § 2339A prosecutions, which criminalize fundraising, recruit-
ing, procuring equipment, creating a “support cell,” providing one’s 
self as personnel, and establishing and running training camps, 
among other preparatory acts, an informant may more easily implant 
a criminal disposition and elicit the act when there is such a tenuous 
connection to the underlying predicate offense, which need not be 
successful or even attempted.  The line between permissible artifice 
and impermissible inducement blurs for extremely inchoate crimes, 
because it would be difficult for the government to set a trap without 
simultaneously inducing the very criminality it intends to identify and 
neutralize.  Provision of one’s self as personnel and recruitment, as 
activities preliminary to a still unrealized conspiracy, may be easily 
and inadvertently induced by a government agent who believes he or 
 
 61 UNDERCOVER AND SENSITIVE OPERATIONS UNIT:  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON FBI 
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/
undercover.htm#general. 
 62 Id. 
 63 One Moroccan informant was threatened with designation as a person “likely to engage 
in terrorist activity,” if he did not work undercover for the state.  Romney, supra note 15 
(describing coercive tactics that government officials use to pressure immigrants to be-
come informants). 
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she is merely setting a trap for the “unwary criminal.”64  At the mar-
gins of criminal liability, giving a suspect the opportunity becomes 
the equivalent of forcing the crime.  For instance, an undercover in-
formant could not likely use artifice to lure a willing criminal into at-
tendance at a training camp without in part inducing that offense. 
Stated another way, since entrapment is rebutted by establishing 
the relevant predisposition, the Government might arrest and convict 
persons based on their “predisposition” to be trained or recruited by 
jihadists.  A predisposition to commit such an inchoate (pre-
conspiracy) offense could only be established by pointing to the de-
fendant’s ideology and statements.  And though § 2339A charges 
have survived First Amendment challenges,65 no court has treated 
these First Amendment issues in the context of an aggressive under-
cover investigation and sting operation. 
Professor Bruce Hay has written of the “signaling” effect of sting 
operations and the dangers of entrapment.  He has argued that if the 
unwary innocent may be as easily convinced to commit the act as the 
unwary criminal, then the sting is not probative of criminality and 
more likely to constitute entrapment.66  However, Hay, who character-
izes sting operations as tests to separate potential from actual law-
breakers, seemingly misses the irony in the search for a pre-
inducement criminal: 
 The background odds are derived from whatever information is 
made available to the decision maker concerning the defendant’s likelihood 
of being a criminal.  It might be statements that the defendant makes to po-
lice or third parties, either before or after the sting.  It might be earlier 
arrests or convictions for similar offenses.  It might be other evidence of 
the defendant’s character or criminal propensities.67 
The predisposition inquiry is at base an adjudication of character, not 
conduct.  When the criminalized act is highly inchoate, commission 
requires so little, and a predicate offense need not even be at-
tempted, an undercover operation is far more likely to trigger com-
mission by a person with no predisposition to commit the actual un-
derlying crime. 
If completion, attempt, or even an agreement to commit the un-
derlying offenses were required by § 2339A, the risk of entrapment 
would be substantially lower.  But where the underlying offense is 
 
 64 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). 
 65 See United States v. Amawi, 545 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ohio 2008); United States v. Sattar, 
314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 66 See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387, 397–
401 (2005). 
 67 Id. at 405 (emphases added). 
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committed in preparation for a conspiracy to commit a listed crime 
or conspiracy itself under § 956(a), the risk of entrapment is decid-
edly more pronounced.  Though the Government, in rebuttal, will 
likely offer evidence of the defendant’s predisposition to furnish ma-
terial support to the underlying conspiracy to commit an offense, the 
remoteness of the defendant’s actions and intentions from any un-
derlying prohibited conduct indicates prosecutors run a far higher 
risk of convicting the “unwary innocent” whose conduct may well 
have been within the law, widely despised but not illegal.  With re-
spect to § 2339A -- § 956(a) charges, “aiding-and-abetting a conspir-
acy” which may or may not materialize, the State may find itself 
prosecuting the only “crimes” of which it has evidence:  unpopular 
speech and unpopular association.  Speech, association, training, re-
cruitment, and provision of one’s self to the jihadist movement with 
no involvement in a conspiracy may all be evidence of a generalized 
“dangerousness,” but not a crime.  There is a defect in § 2339A that 
undercover operations have exploited. 
The risk of entrapping the innocent is particularly high when the 
Government conceives of the plot and takes substantial steps to aid in 
its commission, without waiting for the suspects to take the bait and 
reveal themselves as “would-be violators of the law.”68  While most 
§ 2339A cases arise from arrests that are the product of tips, surveil-
lance, or other forms of detection, only a few cases have arisen from 
aggressive, long-term undercover operations.  In the next part, I ana-
lyze the fact patterns of four prominent cases that arose from such 
circumstances. 
III.  CASE STUDIES IN ANTICIPATORY PROSECUTION AND THE LINE 
SEPARATING PERMISSIBLE STINGS FROM ENTRAPMENT 
A.  United States v. Batiste 
The most prominent ongoing case built on an undercover coun-
terterrorism operation is United States v. Batiste.69  In June 2006, the 
FBI arrested a group of young Haitian-Americans (“the Liberty City 
Seven”),70 five of whom were citizens, none of whom had ties to a ji-
 
 68 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). 
69   Indictment, United States v. Batiste et al., No. 06-20373 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2006), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/cts_batiste_indictment.pdf.  
70 See Kirk Semple, U.S. Falters In Terror Case Against 7 In Miami, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at 
A28. 
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hadist group.71  They allegedly conspired to blow up federal buildings 
in Miami and the Sears Tower in Chicago.72  The seven defendants 
were indicted on four counts of § 2339A for providing material sup-
port and resources, including the provision of themselves as “person-
nel,” in preparation for the following predicate crimes:  (1) agreeing 
to work under al Qaeda’s “direction and control”; (2) provision of 
personnel for the destruction or attempted destruction of buildings 
and the attempt to conceal that support; and (3) levying war against 
the U.S. government.73  None of the accused is Muslim; rather Batiste 
had used the “embassy” for religious instruction, according to neigh-
bors interviewed, in the Moorish Science Temple of America, a syn-
cretic religion which was founded in the early twentieth century.74  
The undercover agent submitted that Batiste had initially sought help 
from terrorists to execute their plan through an acquaintance before 
formally swearing allegiance to al Qaeda.75  The indictment alleges 
that the undercover investigation was initiated after Batiste reached 
out to a third party who informed the FBI of Batiste’s intentions to 
secure jihadist support for his plans in the United States.76  The agent 
stated that Batiste was “willing to work with al Qaeda to accomplish 
the mission and wanted to travel with [the informant] overseas to 
make appropriate connections.”77  The indictment states that Batiste 
wanted to create an “Islamic Army” and contends that Batiste re-
quested “radios, binoculars, bullet proof vests, firearms, vehicles, and 
$50,000 cash” from the agent.78 
The defense disputed this account, arguing the informant pro-
vided the defendants with a list of necessary hardware for jihadists, 
led them in an oath of allegiance to al Qaeda which was videotaped, 
and even informed them that al Qaeda wanted to blow up an FBI 
 
71 See Carol J. Williams & Richard B. Schmitt, FBI Says 7 Terror Suspects Were Mostly Talk, L.A. 
TIMES, June 24, 2006, at A5. 
 72 See Vanessa Blum, 6 Held in Terror Case Denied Bail, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A21; Chris-
topher Drew & Eric Lichtblau, Two Views of Terror Suspects:  Die-Hards or Dupes, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 1, 2006, at A1; Pincus, supra note 9; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71. 
 73 Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 3, 9, 11.  At the time bail was denied, a seventh de-
fendant was detained in Atlanta.  See Blum, supra note 72; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 
71. 
 74 See Pincus, supra note 9; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71.  The FBI later shifted them to 
a warehouse so surveillance could proceed without agents being noticed.  See Pincus, su-
pra note 9. 
 75 See Blum, supra note 72; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71.  The second and principal 
informant was paid $17,000 and also received approval of his petition for political asylum.  
See Pincus, supra note 9. 
 76 Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 4–5 . 
 77 Pincus, supra note 9 (alteration in original). 
 78 Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 4–5. 
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building in Miami.79  Significantly, the informant told Batiste that a 
televised bin Laden statement warning of a strike inside the United 
States was a reference to his plot.80 
The Government informant was the group’s only link to a terrorist 
organization.81  Batiste’s counsel emphasized that the FBI had un-
earthed “no evidence that his client had met with any real terrorist, 
received e-mails or wire transfers from the Middle East, possessed any 
al-Qaeda literature, or had even a picture of bin Laden.”82  In fact, 
FBI Deputy Director John Pistole described the defendants as “more 
aspirational than operational,” with no real capability of committing 
the acts.83  In seven months of undercover surveillance, the group on-
ly received six pairs of boots and the use of a digital video camera 
from the agent.  The raid uncovered no weapons, and the authorities 
refused to say what, if anything, had been seized.84  The prosecutor 
did contend that Narseal Batiste, the group’s alleged leader, had 
asked the FBI informant to provide the group with rockets and semi-
automatic rifles.85  According to the indictment, Batiste had also al-
legedly communicated his plans to the informant, stating he wanted 
to “kill all the devils we can” in an attack that would “be just as good 
or greater than 9/11.”86  Batiste, who claimed he wanted al Qaeda’s 
training, invited the informant at one point to travel with him to Chi-
cago to meet his “top two generals” for the plot, but the trip never 
 
 79 See Blum, supra note 72 (“[D]efense lawyers argued . . . that the government informant—
not their clients—drove the alleged plot.”); Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72 (stating that 
a lawyer for one of the defendants believed the government informant had played a 
“large role . . . in the case.  In one tape, the informant recited what F.B.I. agents said was 
an authentic Qaeda oath, while the seven men sat on a sofa and chairs in a warehouse 
that the F.B.I. had wired with eavesdropping equipment.  As the informant repeated the 
words for a second time, each defendant stood and stated his name before they all said in 
unison that they were committing themselves to the ‘path of jihad.’”); Williams & 
Schmitt, supra note 71 (“[T]his case was developed exclusively through information pro-
vided by the undercover operative, a circumstance that could allow defense lawyers to ar-
gue entrapment.”). 
 80 Pincus, supra note 9. 
 81 See Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71 (noting that “the ‘Al Qaeda representative’ [the 
suspects] were dealing with was an operative with the South Florida Joint Terrorism Task 
Force”). 
 82 Pincus, supra note 9. 
 83 Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pincus, su-
pra note 9 (“[C]ourt records released since then suggest that what Gonzales described as 
a ‘deadly plot’ was virtually the pipe dream of a few men with almost no ability to pull it 
off on their own.”). 
 84 See Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71. 
 85 Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72. 
 86 Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 6; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 72. 
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took place.87  Counsel for Batiste’s codefendants disputed that their 
clients knew of Batiste’s intentions, but authorities countered that at 
least two had confessed to knowledge of the Sears Tower plot.  The 
subordinates had elected to participate in the photographing and vi-
deotaping of target buildings in Miami.88 
The Government alleges the Sears Tower idea was Batiste’s alone, 
but does not dispute that the informant suggested bombing the FBI 
and other federal buildings in Miami and suggested four other cities 
to add to the plot.89  Nor does it dispute that the informant supplied 
the men with camera equipment and urged them to case the gov-
ernment buildings in Miami.  Federal officials also did not dispute 
that Batiste’s group had “no ability to carry out the proposed at-
tacks.”90  The prosecutor stated that the group ultimately disbanded 
after a dispute with another Moorish leader from Chicago, Charles 
James Stewart, also known as Sultan Khan Bey, with whom Batiste had 
discussed the plot.  Recorded conversations between the two leaders 
revealed the pair smoking marijuana and talking about a “Moorish 
nation” to come.91  Material support of terrorism does not appear to 
have been central in their thoughts. 
Then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated, “[t]hese men 
were unable to advance their deadly plot beyond the initial planning 
phase.”92  To Gonzales, the fact that the South Florida Joint Terrorism 
Task Force informant was the group’s only link to al Qaeda did not 
diminish their liability.  Another senior DOJ official acknowledged 
that the men had been arrested well before they acquired any capac-
ity to pull off the crimes and even well before there was any clear idea 
as to what the FBI had actually foiled, if anything, with the arrests:  
“You may never know what you prevented,” he said, “but those may 
be our greatest successes.”93  On December 13, 2007, one defendant 
in the Batiste case was acquitted, and a mistrial was declared for the 
six others.94  In April 2008, the retrial resulted in a second hung jury.  
Nevertheless, prosecutors are seeking to convict the defendants for a 
 
 87 Pincus, supra note 9, at A6. 
 88 See Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72. 
 89 See Pincus, supra note 9. 
 90 Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72. 
 91 See Pincus, supra note 9.  When he arrived in Miami on the FBI’s dollar, Stewart told Ba-
tiste that he wished to create a Moorish nation with his wife, whom he called Queen Zaki-
yaah, and a Moorish army.  Id. 
 92 See Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71, (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93 Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 See Semple, supra note 70. 
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third time.95  The third trial began in February 2009 and resulted in 
five convictions and one acquittal.96 
B.  United States v. Hayat 
Hamid Hayat, a twenty-three-year-old Pakistani-American citizen, 
was convicted on one count of § 2339A for provision of “material 
support and resources . . . [and] personnel in the form of his person” 
in preparation for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332B (Acts of Terrorism 
Transcending National Boundaries) and three counts of making false 
statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001) for concealing “the fact that he had re-
ceived jihadist training, and that he [had] return[ed] to the United 
States for the purpose of waging jihad.”97  The evidence for the mate-
rial support conviction was that Hayat had allegedly attended a ji-
hadist training camp in Pakistan between the Fall of 2003 and the Fall 
of 2004 and had returned to the United States with the “[i]ntent to 
[w]age [j]ihad.”98  The government offered recorded “confessions” in 
which the FBI elicited non-committal responses to leading questions.  
It is unclear from the transcript whether Hayat fully understood the 
questions or their import.  The interrogation was so poorly crafted 
and coercive that a veteran decorated FBI agent was ready to testify 
for the defense when the trial judge denied him the opportunity.99  
An FBI agent admitted at one point during the trial that he had never 
been able to conclusively establish that Hayat had attended a jihadist 
 
 95 See Editorial, A Trial Too Far, WASH. POST, May 2, 2008, at A20; Editorial, Give Up on “Lib-
erty City Seven” Case, TAMPA TRIB., May 8, 2008, at 12. 
 96 See Carmen Gentile, U.S. Begins Third Effort to Convict 6 in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2009, at A19; Damien Cave and Carmen Gentile, Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears 
Tower, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A19. 
 97 First Superseding Indictment at 2–4, United States v. Hayat, No. 05-240 (E.D. Cal. 2007), 
available at http://www.milnet.com/terr-cases/Lodi-Five/1st-superceding-indictment-
hayat-dist-court.pdf. 
 98 Id. at 3. 
 99 The following is an excerpt from the crucial “confession”: 
“Targets in the U.S?” the agent asked again. 
“You mean like buildings?” 
“Yeah, buildings,” the agent nodded.  “Sacramento or San Francisco?” 
“I’ll say Los Angeles and San Francisco.” 
“Financial, commercial?” 
“I’ll say finance and things like that.” 
“Hospitals?” the agent suggested. 
“Maybe, I’m sure.” 
“Who ran the camp?” 
“Maybe my grandfather.” 
“Al Qaeda?  Al Qaeda runs?” 
“I’ll say they run the camp. . . . Yeah, that’s what I’ll say.” 
  Arax, supra note 9 (omission in original). 
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training camp in Pakistan.100  The indictment stated that Hayat had 
“among other things, received training in physical fitness, firearms, 
and means to wage jihad.”101  Upon returning to the United States, 
Hayat’s plane was diverted to Narita, Japan, where in an interrogation 
he denied (the Government said “concealed”) that he had attended a 
jihadist training camp.102 
Naseem Khan, the undercover informant, had developed a close 
relationship with the Hayat family, encouraging Hamid to speak 
about his views on jihad, his scrapbook of jihadist clips, and his 
grandfather’s alleged training camp in Pakistan.  Hayat resisted his 
suggestion that he join the movement: 
“I’m going to fight jihad,” Khan declared.  “You don’t believe, huh?” 
“No man, these days there’s no use in doing that.  Listen, these days we 
can’t go into Afghanistan . . . . The American CIA is there.”103 
At other points during the four years Khan spent pushing Hayat, 
Khan’s questions elicited different responses.  In reference to the 
murder of Daniel Pearl, an American reporter in Pakistan, Hayat 
said, “I’m pleased about that.  They cut him into pieces and sent him 
back.  That was a good job they did.  Now they can’t send one Jewish 
person to Pakistan.”104  But in response to Khan’s prodding to attend 
a camp, he was non-committal:  “I’m ready, I swear. My father tells 
me, ‘Man, what a better task than this.’  But when does my mother 
permit it?”105  It remains unclear why Hayat was not detained in Japan 
and refused entry to the United States if he was such a security threat 
and would only be arrested soon thereafter.106 
Significantly, a crucial piece of evidence at trial was a prayer Hayat 
kept in his wallet, a tawiz, which suggested violent motives to jurors 
unfamiliar with Islam.107  In fact, the tawiz was commonplace and most 
frequently interpreted as a non-violent plea for protection against 
enemies.108  That this piece of evidence was so central to the prosecu-
 
100 Id. 
101 First Superseding Indictment, Hayat, supra note 97, at 3. 
102 Id. at 3–4. 
103 Arax, supra note 9 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104  Id. 
105 Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 See id. (“Why, if . . . [Hayat] was such a threat to national security, did the FBI take him off 
a ‘No Fly’ list and let him reenter the U.S.?”). 
107  See Waldman, supra note 60. 
108 Id.  Some of the translations of the prayer include the following. The government’s ex-
pert witness testified that the prayer translated was: “Oh Allah, we place you at their 
throats, and we seek refuge in you from their evil.”  Arax, supra note 9.  A book entitled 
The Prophet’s Prayers translated it as: “Oh Allah, we pray that you put fear in the hearts of 
our enemies and ask for your protection against their mischief.”  See Waldman, supra note 
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tion’s case demonstrates the paltriness of the evidence against Hayat.  
The defendant’s motion for a retrial based on juror bias and miscon-
duct was denied in May 2007.109 
C.  United States v. Lakhani 
In New Jersey’s first post-9/11 terrorism case, British citizen He-
mant Lakhani was convicted of material support under § 2339A:  pro-
viding material support and resources preparatory to violations of 
three predicate offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 32 (destruction of aircraft or 
aircraft facilities), § 2332a (use of weapons of mass destruction) and 
§ 2332b (acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries).110  
Lakhani stood accused of willfully and knowingly engaging in the 
brokering of Russian portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs) without a license.111  A Pakistani-born undercover agent, Mu-
hammad Habib Ur Rehman, who in approximately twenty months 
had 150 conversations with Lakhani, represented himself as a buyer 
for the Ogaden Liberation Front in Somalia interested in purchasing 
anti-aircraft missiles.112  During this conversation, Lakhani also stated 
that bin Laden had “straightened them all out” and “did a good 
thing.”113  Lakhani produced an arms brochure and claimed that he 
had contacts inside a military production company.  At a meeting in 
New Jersey, Lakhani was informed that the missiles were to be used by 
jihadists who wanted to target airliners on the anniversary of 9/11.  
The agent stated “this is not a legal business,” and Lakhani acknowl-
edged this.114  After allegedly discussing prior arms sales, Lakhani 
 
60.  The Muslim Students Association/University of Southern California hadith database 
translates the prayer as:  “O Allah, we make thee our shield against them, and take refuge 
in Thee from their evils.”  Id.  See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hamid Hayat 
Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges (Sept. 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html (citing only the trans-
lation of the government’s expert witness in Islamic law). 
109 See Judge Rejects Retrial in Pakistan Training Case, REUTERS, May 17, 2007, http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1743994020070518; see also Order Deny-
ing Defendant’s Motion for Retrial, United States v. Hayat, No: 2:05-cr-240-GEB (E.D. 
Cal. May 17, 2007), available at http://207.41.19.127/caed/DOCUMENTS 
/Opinions/Burrell/05-240.2.pdf. 
110 Superseding Indictment at 6–7, United States v. Lakhani, No. 03-880 (D.N.J. 2007). 
111 See Man Guilty of Trying to Sell Missiles in Sting Operation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, at A11; 
Ronald Smothers, Man Pleads Not Guilty in Plot to Sell Missiles for Terror Use, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
10, 2004, at B6. 
112 See United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2007); Tareco Affidavit at 1, 
United States v. Lakhani, No. 03-7106, (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2003); Robert Hanley, Jury Hears 2 
Views of Man Accused in Missile Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at B5. 
113 Tareco Affidavit, supra note 112, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114 Id. at 2. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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agreed to the deal.  At another meeting, Lakhani inquired about the 
planned terrorist strike, suggesting it was to “make one explo-
sion . . . to shake the economy.”115  Through intermediaries, Lakhani 
secured payment from the cooperating witness to make the purchase 
from Russia.116  According to the indictment, Lakhani did manifest 
some technical knowledge throughout.117  Not only was he a trader of 
groceries, rice, textiles, and oil; he had also lawfully traded weap-
ons.118 
Finally, in July 2003, after the FBI money was wired, Lakhani and 
the cooperating witness traveled to Moscow to finalize the transfer 
with the suppliers, who were undercover Russian Federal Security 
Service (FSB) agents also cooperating with the FBI.119  Lakhani did 
not recognize that the missile on display was a decoy; the FBI trans-
ferred the actual weapon to the United States by plane.120  In St. Pe-
tersburg, Lakhani discussed the possibility of purchasing an addi-
tional fifty SAMs and a multi-ton quantity of C-4 plastic explosive.121  A 
bill of lading was produced to confirm authorization to pay $70,000 
for the SAMs.122  Lakhani was finally arrested in Newark, after meeting 
with the informant at a hotel overlooking the Newark airport.123 
Lakhani’s counsel argued that this supply-and-buy sting amounted 
to an elaborate scheme to entrap the “unwary innocent,” who other-
wise would not have had the intent or means to orchestrate the 
deal.124  These sting operations raise questions about the defendant’s 
predisposition, since undercover agents were on both sides of the ex-
change with the defendant ensnared as an unwitting mediator.  The 
defense ultimately failed to persuade the jury that the plot and intent 
were implanted by the government.125  In affirming the jury’s rejec-
tion of the entrapment defense, the Third Circuit found that Lak-
hani’s “ready response” was “amply demonstrated by his multiple, 
 
115 Id. at 3 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 Id. at 7. 
117 Superseding Indictment, Lakhani, supra note 110, at 2–3. 
118 United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2007). 
119 Tareco Affidavit, supra note 112, at 7. 
120 Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 177. 
121  Tareco Affidavit, supra note 112, at 7. 
122 Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 177. 
123 Id. (“Lakhani remarked, ‘[I]f we strike fifty at one time, simultaneously, it will f— their 
mother. . . .  It will shake them.  Then they will run. . . . Strike simultaneously 
at . . . whatever time you decide.  All at once in different cities at the same time. . . . They 
will think the war has started.’”) (omissions in original); Man Guilty of Trying to Sell Missiles 
in Sting Operation, supra note 111. 
124 Lichtblau, supra note 9. 
125 Id. 
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self-financed trips to the Ukraine in search of a missile.”126  Along with 
his orchestration of the money laundering scheme and the fraudu-
lent bill of lading, this established predisposition and the absence of 
any “reluctance.”127  However, the court did reject the Government’s 
assertion that it could establish predisposition based on a prior 
course of criminal conduct, since none of the evidence proved Lak-
hani’s prior arms deals were unlawful.128 
D.  United States v. Siraj 
Shahawar Matin Siraj was indicted on one count of conspiracy to 
use explosives to destroy a building or other real property (here, the 
Herald Square subway station in New York), one count of plotting to 
derail or disable a mass transportation vehicle, one count of conspir-
acy to place a destructive device upon or near a facility used for a 
mass transportation vehicle, and one count of conspiracy to discharge 
and detonate an explosive device in a public transportation system.129  
Though he was not charged with § 2339A, Siraj is included in this 
part due to the FBI’s aggressive use of an undercover informant in 
building the case.  In a case that reveals “the depth of the Police In-
telligence Division’s clandestine programs,” Siraj, a twenty-four-year-
old Pakistani immigrant, frequently worshipped at the Islamic Society 
of Bay Ridge in Brooklyn, a mosque that was tracked by no fewer than 
three NYPD undercover agents.130  Siraj’s trial was the first based on 
an NYPD, not an FBI, investigation since 2001.131  The defense con-
tended that the division’s extensive monitoring of the Brooklyn Mus-
lim community violated a 1985 consent decree, which restricted such 
targeted surveillance of political and religious groups.132  The two 
government witnesses at trial, a fifty-year-old informant named Osa-
ma Eldawoody and an undercover officer, did not even know of each 
other’s existence throughout the investigation.  Eldawoody attended 
575 prayer services at the Bay Ridge mosque and another mosque in 
 
126 Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 179–80 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Id. at 180. 
128 Id. at 179 n.11. 
129 Superseding Indictment at 1–3, United States v. Siraj, No. 05-104 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 
2006). 
130 Rashbaum, supra note 9. 
131 Id. 
132 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 787 F.2d 828 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (establishing the Handschu consent decree); Rashbaum, supra note 9; see also 
Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape:  The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1213 n.43 (2004) (describing the Handschu litigation and noting 
other lawsuits brought against police agencies). 
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Staten Island over the course of thirteen months, supplying his su-
pervising detective with intelligence twice daily for a grand total of 
350 reports based on these visits to the mosque and the Islamic book-
store where Siraj worked.133  NYPD documents refer to numbered 
cases, such as M3 and M24, suggesting that the Intelligence Division’s 
Terrorist Interdiction Unit may have had active investigations at that 
time in at least two dozen mosques citywide.134 
The Egyptian nuclear-engineer-turned-undercover-informant had 
recorded hours of conversations with Siraj, in which the defendant 
described aspirations to blow up bridges and subway stations.135  In 
August 2004, Siraj and co-conspirator James Elshafay, who testified 
against Siraj, inspected the subway station and drafted diagrams to fa-
cilitate bomb placement.136  Upon arrest, no explosives were found.137  
At trial, the defense counsel argued that Eldawoody had entrapped 
Siraj, eliciting violent, anti-American, and anti-Semitic statements, 
declarations of support for bin Laden, and comments on the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis, by showing the young man photos of Abu Ghraib’s 
torture victims, talking about the suffering of the Palestinians, and 
promising that his superiors would supply the explosives for the 
plot.138  The jury ultimately rejected the entrapment defense.139  How-
ever, while Siraj described a willingness to commit terrorist acts and 
even boasted of past crimes, much of the predisposition evidence 
constituted protected speech divorced from any conspiracy.140  
Though the admission of this evidence probably was not outcome-
determinative, constitutionally protected speech should not be in-
voked in the service of disproving entrapment, especially when equal-
ly probative evidence exists.  Eldawoody testified that Siraj had stated 
he hoped Al Qaeda would attack America again and that suicide 
bombings were justified to avenge the deaths of family members.  He 
called bin Laden “a talented brother and a great planner” and said 
 
133 Rashbaum, supra note 9. 
134 Id. 
135 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Shahawar Matin Siraj Sentenced to Thirty Years of 
Imprisonment for Conspiring to Place Explosives at the 34th Street Subway Station in 
New York (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/siraj_pr.pdf. 
136  Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Rashbaum, supra note 9; William K. Rashbaum, Closing Arguments in Trial Of Subway 
Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at B3. 
139 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 135. 
140 See United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that even 
though Siraj’s statements “may be described as reflecting defendant’s political views, 
those statements were properly admitted”). 
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he hoped bin Laden “planned something big for America.”141  How-
ever odious these assertions are to American jurors’ ears, they consti-
tute protected speech and are not probative of a predisposition to 
personally commit an act of terrorism.  As a result of their extensive 
surveillance, the Assistant US Attorneys had accumulated other evi-
dence that suggested such a predisposition for Siraj to commit an act 
of terrorism, not merely to support the acts of others.142  Siraj was sen-
tenced to thirty years in prison on January 8, 2007.143 
IV.  UNAFFILIATED TERRORISM AND MATERIAL SUPPORT 
RECONSIDERED:  REVISING THE CRITERIA FOR PROVING AND DEFEATING 
ENTRAPMENT IN TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 
A.  The Federal Courts Must Redefine Entrapment in the Context of 
Anticipatory Terrorism Prosecutions Under § 2339A and Require a 
Revised Jury Instruction 
The Batiste, Hayat, Lakhani, and Siraj cases all demonstrate the ha-
ziness of the distinction between permissible government artifice and 
entrapment.  The Siraj court stated that, in the context of the en-
trapment defense, “[i]nducement by the government includes ‘solic-
iting, proposing, initiating, broaching or suggesting the commission 
of the offense charged.’”144  But the complexity of sting operations 
demands more nuanced guidance.  The common threads in these 
cases include:  (1) FBI initiation of contact in all four cases (as distin-
guished from drug stings, in which the defendant may initiate the 
contact and sale); (2) FBI provision of equipment or money in Lak-
hani and Batiste; (3) FBI incitement to participate in the global ji-
hadist movement in Hayat, Batiste, and Siraj; (4) FBI contribution to 
the criminal plot or complete design of the plot in all four cases; (5) 
FBI encouragement against the defendant’s resistance, ambivalence, 
uncertainty or rejection in Hayat; (6) FBI (and cooperating agents of 
foreign governments) acting as both buyer and seller in a sting op-
eration in Lakhani; and (7) FBI cultivation of a close relationship with 
the defendant over the course of many months or years in order to 
set a trap in Hayat and Siraj.145  All of these actions are cause for 
 
141 Rashbaum, supra note 138. 
142 Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
143 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 135. 
144 Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 
2006)). 
145 See supra Part III. 
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heightened concern when the Government charges inchoate crimes 
under a statute like § 2339A. 
Several principles and proposals for guarding against entrapment 
emerge from the case law.  The definitional changes to entrapment 
in § 2339A prosecutions should begin with requiring the Government 
to offer evidence of the defendant’s initiation and initiative to exe-
cute the terrorist plot.  If the FBI supplies the overwhelming majority 
of material, plans, targets, and ideological fervor, the crime should be 
deemed per se “implanted.” 
Similarly, courts should instruct juries to be wary of the Govern-
ment’s charges when the informant is the defendant’s only link to an 
FTO or the global jihadist movement.  In Batiste, the agent not only 
created an opportunity for the would-be violators, but instigated and 
secured jihadist loyalty from the defendants.  A court should find it 
difficult to conclude this investigation was not a naked attempt to 
manufacture predisposition evidence for a vulnerable group that 
perhaps shared violent aspirations but likely did not have the capabil-
ity or initiative to commit an act of terrorism.  In addition to the At-
torney General’s Guidelines’ requirement of a reasonable expecta-
tion of precision in isolating unwary criminals, a good faith 
requirement would ensure that undercover agents hew closely to the 
mission of identifying criminals and restrain their complicity and or-
chestration to the essential core of the ploy. 
The informant’s assistance in the plot must be narrowly tailored to 
eliciting the criminal intent of the targets.  The Supreme Court 
would be wholly justified in mandating a form of heightened scrutiny 
for government conduct in the context of inchoate terrorism-related 
offenses, specifically § 2339A.  A tiered system of scrutiny, in which 
inchoate offenses merit a more robust review of entrapment than at-
tempted or completed offenses, would protect defendants from im-
permissible implantation of criminal intent.  Correspondingly, juries 
should be instructed that the Government’s burden on rebuttal will 
be more demanding for inchoate offenses.  If, as in Lakhani and Ba-
tiste, the undercover agent has crafted an elaborate plot in order to 
better situate the unwary innocent, the Government should not be 
permitted to prosecute crimes it largely invented and set in motion 
with meager participation from a vulnerable defendant.  The defen-
dant may very well have different intentions, such as persuading the 
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planation of the Batiste case.146  In comparison, the evidence hints that 
Lakhani may well have had the requisite intent and predisposition to 
further an act of terrorism, but the FBI’s heavy involvement in exe-
cuting the arms transaction tainted the evidence against him.  
Though Lakhani was clearly pleased with his work, had the FBI en-
gaged in surveillance, without assisting quite as much in the pro-
curement and transfer of the missile, it would have made for a sting 
more probative of Lakhani’s actual wrongdoing. 
In contrast to this call for heightened scrutiny in § 2339A cases, 
Professor Dru Stevenson has argued that the predisposition test 
should be “relaxed” by creating a rebuttable presumption of predis-
position whenever entrapment is claimed in a terrorism case.147  Ste-
venson argues that this proposal is rooted in the unique features of 
terrorism, as compared to the set of vice crimes in which the entrap-
ment defense has its roots, namely:  (1) the higher stakes of preven-
tion; (2) the difficulty of detection and arrest; (3) the lack of compul-
siveness and addiction, which leads to self-disclosure; (4) the heinous 
nature of the offense suggesting that only those actually predisposed 
would be caught in the sting; (5) the positive externalities of under-
cover operations in instilling mistrust and fear in terrorist organiza-
tions or cells and giving prosecutors more leverage to flip defendants 
and thereby further the goal of prevention; and (6) the higher cost 
and danger which function as independent regulation of undercover 
terrorism investigations and the diminishing returns of applying en-
trapment.148 
Though this thesis would be compelling for cases involving actual 
attempts, Stevenson inadequately justifies this burden-shifting in the 
context of inchoate crimes like material support.  His argument de-
pends on the “heinous” nature of the crime (though many violent 
crimes fit this imprecise label), as well as questionable assumptions 
about the fixity of terrorism suspects’ ideology, intent, and ultimate 
willingness to act.149  In one part, Stevenson essentially argues en-
trapment is irrelevant in terrorism cases, because “a normal person 
would be immune to inducements.  We can infer predisposition 
merely by the fact that the person agreed to engage in such a horri-
 
146 The defense noted in opening arguments of the third trial that Batiste, a construction 
worker and father of four, repeatedly asked about the promised money on their re-
cordings.  Miami Men Face Third Trial in Terror Plot, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http:// 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29261709/ (last visited May 8, 2009). 
147 Stevenson, supra note 25, at 133–48, 179–97. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 138, 179–97. 
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ble act, and that other evidence of predisposition is unnecessary.”150  
However, the earlier the government intervenes, and the more in-
choate the charges, the less plausible such an argument is.  Given the 
broad swath of ambiguous conduct swept in by § 2339A (which re-
quires neither a formulated conspiracy to violate a predicate offense 
nor a recipient FTO), including provision of one’s self as personnel, 
it is not so clear that anyone caught in a material support sting would 
have done the deed without the inducement. 
In particular, heightened scrutiny of stings is necessary when the 
government and its collaborators act as both buyer and seller in ma-
terial support cases.  To remedy this problem, federal courts should 
adopt the rule set forth in State v. Overmann and State v. Johnson, 
which categorically rejected the use of “take-back” drug stings to re-
veal criminal predisposition.151  Most courts reject the idea that these 
stings betray pre-inducement criminality, since “the operation scarce-
ly signals . . . that the target would sell drugs on his own.”152 
Persistent and ultimately successful government persuasion to 
commit a felony over demonstrable resistance, ambivalence, uncer-
tainty or rejection on the part of the defendant should be an absolute 
bar to prosecution.  When an investigation requires years of under-
cover involvement, an appellate court should closely examine wheth-
er the defendant succumbed early in the process or only after inten-
sive, longstanding pressure.153 
Misrepresentation of the legality of the conduct should be an-
other bar to prosecution.  Jacobson did not explicitly incorporate this 
into the definition of entrapment, but strongly suggested that gov-
ernment misrepresentation of the law should bar prosecution.154  This 
is arguably already covered in the Attorney General’s Guidelines re-
 
150 Id. at 144. 
151 State v. Johnson, 268 N.W.2d 613, 615 (S.D. 1978); State v. Overmann, 220 N.W.2d 914, 
917 (Iowa 1974). 
152 Hay, supra note 66, at 410.  With the exception of some courts that extend the subjective 
approach to even these extreme practices, many hold for automatic acquittal for fear of a 
higher rate of false positives with such tactics.  Id. at 410–11. 
153 This principle has been cited by courts and scholars alike.  See Stevenson for a discussion 
of this principle: 
The predisposition inquiry also considers factors like the alacrity with which the 
defendant embraced the undercover agent’s offer or inducement, the time or 
number of attempts required to obtain the defendant’s participation, and the de-
fendant’s subsequent resolve or hesitation in pursuing the criminal activity. The 
cases also take note of who initiated the first contact, and if it was the government, 
then what reasons the government had to initiate contact with this target. 
  Stevenson, supra note 25, at 137–38 (citing PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (3d 
ed. 2002)). 
154  Jacobson v. U.S., 503 U.S. 540, 553--54 (1992). 
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quirement that “[t]he illegal nature of the activity is reasonably clear 
to potential subjects.”155  However, those provisions do not confer en-
forceable rights on defendants.156  Since the Attorney General’s 
Guidelines are more restrictive than the case law, it is possible that 
making the FBI’s own requirements legally binding will ensure that 
the Government’s investigatory efforts do not squander resources.  
However, most of the criteria do not sound in terms of reasonable-
ness and arguably do not create judicially manageable standards. 
Especially for § 2339A charges based on § 956(a) or other con-
spiracy-capable predicate offenses, there must be a more substantial 
connection to a terrorist organization, an unaffiliated group of ji-
hadists, or any terrorism-related conspiracy, than a single informant’s 
cover story.  In Batiste, which did not include an underlying § 956(a) 
charge, the only preparatory acts were taping the buildings and pro-
viding one’s self as personnel.  Arguably, the defendants could be 
prosecuted under § 956(a) independently if they had agreed upon a 
specific offense, but the FBI intervened before such a meeting of the 
minds.  But to the extent the government ever relies on § 2339A li-
ability instead, the prosecution cannot be allowed to depend solely 
on the false identity of an undercover agent.  This proposed principle 
is supported by the rule that a conspiracy cannot be formed between 
two people if one is an undercover agent.  If that presents a bar to ac-
tual conspiracy liability, what justification can there be for dismissing 
its relevance in the context of pre-conspiracy material support liabil-
ity?  There must be an independent and adequate basis to establish 
that the defendant knowingly or intentionally furthered a conspiracy 
or other predicate offense. 
For acts in furtherance of a conspiracy, it is hard to conceptualize 
this pre-conspiracy liability as crime, due to the overlap with lawful 
activity.  Actions such as fundraising, recruiting, procuring equip-
ment, creating a “support cell,” providing one’s self as personnel, and 
establishing and running training camps, if proven, will usually suf-
fice for conviction on a different charge, such as § 2339D (unlicensed 
military-style training abroad).  Since an “aiding-and-abetting-
conspiracy” offense is quite vague and allows the prosecution to con-
 
155 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, supra note 61. 
156 The “Section VII. Reservation” states explicitly that the guidelines are “solely for the pur-
pose of internal DOJ guidance.  They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied 
upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in 
any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful investi-
gative or litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”  Id. 
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jure an as yet unrealized meeting of the minds, the courts should at 
least strike § 956(a) from the list of predicate offenses in § 2339A. 
Government incitement of religious or ideological fervor, be it to 
attend a militant training camp or madrasa, or to take an oath of loy-
alty to al Qaeda, should be an absolute bar to prosecution.  If the 
Government cannot identify and reveal illegal activity without pres-
suring a target to accept that violence is his or her religious duty, it 
should have no power to convict.  This is primarily because the Gov-
ernment should have a disincentive to instigate the very criminal in-
tent and ideological extremism that counterterrorism operations and 
prosecutions seek to deter.  Not only do these tactics run afoul of the 
federal government’s strategic priorities, but arguably they also im-
permissibly entangle the government in matters of faith and free ex-
ercise.  In Batiste, Siraj and Hayat, incitement could have been in-
strumental in solidifying both the defendant’s commitment to a 
particular material support or conspiracy, and in generating evidence 
of predisposition.  It is likely that the FBI understands such tactics 
verge on entrapment.  However, the FBI probably gambles that if 
enough unpopular speech or threats are elicited from the accused, 
then the jury will find entrapment rebutted on predisposition 
grounds, despite the fact that the defendant’s statements were, in 
fact, post-inducement. 
B.  The Appellate Courts Must Bar Certain Categories of “Predisposition” 
Evidence in the Government’s Rebuttal of Entrapment in Anticipatory 
Terrorism Prosecutions 
May the Government introduce protected speech, or associational 
and religious expression to rebut entrapment?  The district court in 
Siraj defined predisposition strictly as the “state of mind of a defen-
dant before government agents make any suggestion that he should commit a 
crime.”157  In one § 2339A case involving an undercover agent’s testi-
mony, United States v. Nettles, the court listed factors for determining 
“if a defendant was (or was not) predisposed to commit a crime,” in-
cluding: 
(1) [T]he defendant’s character or reputation; (2) whether law en-
forcement officers initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether 
the defendant engaged in the criminal activity for profit; (4) whether de-
fendant showed a reluctance to commit the offense that was overcome by 
 
157 United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
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government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or per-
suasion offered by the government.158 
Though the courts in Hayat, Lakhani, Siraj, and Batiste all admitted 
protected speech as predisposition evidence, there is arguably such a 
high risk of prejudice to the defendant that this evidence cannot be 
probative of whether the defendant would have committed the of-
fense independent of government inducement.  Inchoate offenses 
particularly lend themselves to abuse in this sense, as the threshold 
act requirement is so minimal.159 
Is speech or religious belief probative of a predisposition or will-
ingness to actually commit a terrorism-related offense?  In Hayat, the 
court admitted the defendant’s praise of Daniel Pearl’s murderers.160  
In Siraj, the district court certainly believed such evidence was proba-
tive when it admitted defendant’s statements supporting violent, ter-
rorist activities, statements supporting Osama bin Laden, statements 
boasting of prior terrorist acts, statements supporting violence against 
a religious or ethnic minority (in this case, Jews), statements outlin-
ing plots to bomb the subway station, statements conveying a desire 
to blow up bridges and subway stations, books and videotapes advo-
cating jihad, and videos of terrorist strikes and other attacks on civil-
ians that the narrator blames on Americans.161  These were all admit-
ted to rebut the defendant’s claim that he never entertained such 
violent criminal designs before meeting the informant, who “in-
flam[ed] him with political discussions on subjects such as the war in 
Iraq and . . . pictures of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.”162  Though 
the court held that the First Amendment does not bar admission of 
verbal support for jihadist activity as predisposition evidence,163 fed-
eral courts should revisit the answer to this question. 
Limiting predisposition evidence to only that which betrays an in-
tent to engage in “imminent lawless action,”164 would sweep too 
 
158 United States v. Nettles, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
159 See generally Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism:  Liberalism Clashes with Fundamentalism, 
37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005) (exploring the tension between prosecution of inchoate ter-
rorism-related offenses and guarding protected speech and association, which are hall-
mark rights of democratic life, with particular attention to the distinction between sup-
porting or joining an organization and furthering its unlawful purposes). 
160 Arax, supra note 9. 
161 See supra Part III.D. 
162 Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 419. 
163 Id. at 419–20. 
164 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (invalidating an Ohio statute that 
punished people who advocate violence as a means of political reform or who “‘justify’ 
the commission of violent acts ‘with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety 
of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism,’” among other actions). 
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broadly in excluding both statements of generalized support and 
statements of intent to carry out acts of terrorism.  A revised, slightly 
narrower test would substantially contribute to the goal of protecting 
unwary innocents from entrapment, while still preserving flexibility 
for the Government to prove predisposition.  Building on cases such 
as Scales v. United States, which prohibited Smith Act prosecutions of 
mere “expression[s] of sympathy with the alleged criminal enter-
prise,”165 the Court held in Brandenburg v. Ohio that the First Amend-
ment will not allow the prosecution of “advocacy of the use of force 
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action.”166  Similarly, mere statements of sympathy or advo-
cacy should not be admissible as predisposition evidence unless the 
government can demonstrate that this speech constituted the an-
nouncement of a concrete plan, boasting of past terrorism-related of-
fenses, or incitement to “imminent” terrorism.167  Only the latter cat-
egories of content are relevant to whether the defendant would have 
committed the crime in the absence of government inducement. 
The optimal rule would be a compromise that preserves the Gov-
ernment’s access to verbalized intentions to commit acts of terrorism:  
communications or statements that describe future or present plans 
to commit violent terrorism-related crimes would be admissible, whe-
reas political statements of support that do not contain elements of 
incitement or revelations as to criminal plots would be inadmissible.  
The Siraj court was therefore partly right and partly wrong.  The sym-
pathetic statements for al Qaeda, terrorist activity, and media advocat-
ing the same were not probative of the defendant’s predisposition to 
commit a crime. Hamid Hayat’s support for the murderers of Daniel 
Pearl was equally irrelevant to proving predisposition or the § 2339A 
charge. 
To protect First Amendment rights and guard against abusive 
stings and entrapment, the courts should only admit evidence that is 
probative of a readiness to engage in a violation of § 2339A and fur-
 
165 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961) (“[T]he statute is found to reach only 
‘active’ members having also a guilty knowledge and intent . . . which therefore prevents a 
conviction on what otherwise might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy 
with the alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any significant action in its sup-
port or any commitment to undertake such action.”). 
166 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
167 It should be noted that Congress has never enacted nor could it constitutionally enact a 
law prohibiting the “glorification” of terrorism, as the amended British anti-terrorism law 
of 2006 did.  Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf. 
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ther the predicate offenses.  Though these forms of evidence will not 
always be separable—in which case the Government should win the 
tie—the dangers posed by combining potential jury bias, pre-
conspiracy preparatory offenses, and undercover agent pressure are 
simply too significant to admit evidence that demonstrates general-
ized sympathy for jihadist activity, but not a willingness to personally 
engage in that conduct.  The court in Siraj erred in concluding that 
in spite of the First Amendment, the fact that “defendant’s statements 
contain political expression does not insulate defendant from their 
use at trial,” since his statements also boasted of committing violent 
acts, and regularly expressed support for terrorism.168 
Siraj was not a § 2339A case and, even still, the court ostensibly re-
stricted the permissible forms of predisposition evidence to: 
(1) [A]n existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for 
which the defendant is charged; (2) an already formed design on the 
part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged; or (3) a 
willingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by 
the accused’s ready response to the inducement.  With respect to a de-
fendant’s “ready response” to the inducement, a defendant is predis-
posed to commit a crime, if he is “ready and willing” without persuasion 
to commit the crime charged and awaiting any propitious opportunity to 
do so.169 
In Hayat, the danger of baseless conviction was realized.  It is likely 
that the jury would not have been persuaded of the defendant’s ma-
terial support to himself to commit a further crime if his statements 
had been excluded.  Given the consequences of admitting such un-
popular, but protected, speech, the court should rule it inadmissible 
when the statements do not contain any information on probable 
past or future plots. 
C.  There Are Inherent Defects in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A That Require 
Amendment 
Statutory amendment may ultimately be required to clarify the 
scope of liability under § 2339A and the relation of inchoate terror-
ism-related offenses to entrapment.  First, § 2339A should be 
amended to require that if the predicate offense is a conspiracy, then 
the conspiracy must be formulated.  Forcing the Government to de-
fer arrests until the conspiracy is formed will not vastly increase the 
 
168 Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 420. 
169 Id. at 415 (citing United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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risk of a plot’s execution.170  Second, § 2339A and § 956(a) could ex-
pressly outline what acts must be the defendant’s alone and what acts 
may permissibly be facilitated by an undercover agent.  Considering 
the equivocal nature of these preliminary, inchoate steps to commis-
sion and the wide latitude it confers on the prosecution, Congress 
could more specifically restrict the scope of material support with an 
agency restriction.  The overlap with lawful speech and associational 
activity strongly supports a call for clarification of which acts may be 
committed or facilitated by the undercover agent in a sting. 
D.  Policy Reasons for Revising the Entrapment Defense 
First, while the FBI, the NYPD Intelligence Division, and other in-
vestigative agencies will more frequently deploy undercover infor-
mants, and not just in a listening mode, they risk alienating the Mus-
lim-American and immigrant communities that police and 
undercover agents rely on for tips.  It is no secret to these communi-
ties that undercover agents have infiltrated and monitored their reli-
gious and communal lives.  Vigorously policing entrapment in the 
context of inchoate terrorism-related offenses will reign in abusive 
practices.  While this will not assure Muslim Americans that they are 
free from police surveillance, it will send signals that the government 
disapproves of aggressively preying on disaffected, volatile youth and 
unpopular, though protected, beliefs. 
Second, creating a more robust entrapment defense will incentiv-
ize greater creativity amongst federal and local agents to devise traps 
that will draw out the willing terrorist’s plot without implanting crim-
inal intent in the minds of vulnerable innocents.  It may also create 
incentives to monitor suspects for a longer period of time before 
turning to an informant or arresting a suspect.  Choosing surveillance 
over early intervention is always a risk, as the Department of Justice 
would probably argue.  A strong counterargument is that deferring 
intervention in favor of persistent surveillance allows the police to 
discover the full scope of a plot and the greatest number of partici-
pants.171 
 
170 The charging of § 956(a) and § 2339A together could very well be unconstitutional if the 
Supreme Court ever considered that combination’s near-eradication of the act require-
ment. 
171 Many analysts have said that London’s MI5 was able to make sweeping arrests in July 2006 
to foil the British Airways plot because it had waited and watched suspects for nearly a 
year.  The investigation into the previous summer’s bus and underground bombings led 
to the July 2006 arrests.  See John Ward Anderson & Karen DeYoung, Britain Arrests 24 
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A third reason for this adjustment concerns the FBI’s resources.  
The FBI should embrace the revision of entrapment (in doctrine, 
jury instructions and the Attorney General’s Guidelines) as an oppor-
tunity to direct finite resources with surgical precision toward pursu-
ing unwary terrorists with live plots, not those who might succumb to 
years of pressure and persuasion.  If the FBI terrorism task forces aim 
to identify all persons on U.S. soil who sympathize with al Qaeda and 
test them to see if they will join a terrorist plot, they will inevitably fail 
to identify an actual, materializing threat with this overbroad strategy.  
But if the FBI aims to identify suspects with a plan in search of an op-
portunity, their conviction rates will almost definitely improve.  In 
this respect, federal material support statutes, freewheeling charging 
under § 2339A, pretextual charging, and weak enforcement of the 
entrapment prohibition are allowing investigations to become unfo-
cused and incomplete.  An investigation that can secure conviction or 
removal quite readily with meager evidence is an investigation that 
may stop short of discovering all of a suspect’s contacts and plans.  It 
is shortsighted to think that keeping entrapment ineffectual will 
benefit law enforcement in the long run.172 
 Fourth, in a similar vein, more stringent application of the en-
trapment defense should cause the FBI to rethink how it recruits un-
dercover informants.  Instead of leaving its most sensitive cases to co-
erced informants whose interests in the venture arise from the 
potential for personal gain, not public duty, the FBI should only be 
recruiting full-time undercover agents with relevant language skills 
and background.  Training agents to investigate crimes undercover 
and lay traps for those suspected of a desire to personally engage in 
an act of terrorism would likely reduce abusive practices that result in 
the implantation of criminal intent.  The current hired guns are not 
formally associated with the FBI and probably harbor no sense of loy-
alty or duty to the criminal justice system that has essentially black-
mailed them into this role.  Eliminating this practice of recruitment 
by coercion could ensure that the undercover operatives understand 
the danger of entrapment, at least in a practical sense, and are 
grounded in the institution’s goals and responsibilities.  A higher 
conviction rate could well be the result. 
 
Suspected Conspirators, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at A1; Craig Whitlock & Dafna Linzer, 
Tip Followed ‘05 Attacks on London Transit, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at A1. 
172 But cf. Stevenson, supra note 25, at 179–97 (arguing that a relaxed entrapment standard 
would enhance the benefits of sting operations, which include a reduction in government 
surveillance and its attendant risks to civil liberties, and the deterrence and weakening of 
terrorist cells consumed by mistrust and fear due to the infiltration). 
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 Finally, revising entrapment in the context of inchoate terrorism-
related offenses is particularly necessary to safeguard the freedoms of 
speech and association that American government officials swear to 
uphold, no matter how unpopular.  But the reason is not only consti-
tutional; there is also a practical dimension.  Speech, worship, and as-
sociation are all outlets for strong personal emotions—if chilled or 
blocked, some will inevitably interpret this as hostile to their identity 
and turn to crimes of violence.  Prosecutors need to ensure that their 
charges of choice do not unconstitutionally infringe these protected 
outlets.  American values, the way Muslims inside and outside Amer-
ica perceive the U.S. government and police forces, and the ability of 
agents to identify legitimate suspects depend on keeping these outlets 
open.  Balancing effective surveillance against the possibility of chill-
ing speech, worship, and association is a delicate exercise.  However, 
the FBI and other investigative bodies have not fully grappled with 
the negative consequences of unrestrained undercover infiltration.  
This suggests that the FBI needs to reconsider how aggressively it uses 
undercover sting operations and whether it is trapping a criminal or 
implanting the very designs it seeks to prevent. 
 
